A new episode started recently, after the change of government as a result of presidential and parliamentary elections in November 1996. The UDMR, the political party of the Hungarians living in Romania, takes part in the new coalition, and the relationship between Romania and Hungary (and other neighbouring countries) has improved radically. This new situation can effect the discussion about territorial autonomy in two ways: it could mean the return of the demand for autonomy, but it is also possible that the improvement of the position of the Hungarian minority will make the whole discussion about more autonomy superfluous.
This article will deal with the advantages and disadvantages of the creation of territorial autonomy for the Hungarians in Romania. After a short introduction of the history of the Hungarian minority in Romania , the question will be raised whether there is a conflict situation between Hungarians and Romanians or not. In the third section the background of the basic treaty will be discussed. The different points of view about autonomy will get attention in section four. The next section reveals the position of Romanians in Hungary . Section six looks at the situation after the change of government in November 1996.
Ad 1: The question of who came first
For both Hungary and Romania, Transylvania is the cradle of culture and
civilization. Therefore, the main dispute centres on one question: who
was there first? In the Hungarian version, the Magyars in Transylvania
belonged to the stream of Magyars who came from the region between the
middle reaches of the River Volga and the Ural Mountains in the 10th century.
They occupied the Pannonian lowlands and Transylvania, regions which they
found largely unpopulated. According to this version, the Romanians came
later: only in the 13th century did Romanian nomads and shepherds cross
the Carpathian mountains, and the Hungarians were so kind as to give them
the right to settle.
The Romanian version of the settlement of Transylvania is quite different.
They claim that the Szeklers were originally Romanians who were forced
to become Hungarian. According to official Romanian history, Transylvania
was the core of the Dacian Empire, an area that became part of the Roman
Empire in the second century. The Romanian national culture was the result
of the mixing of Dacian and Roman culture. The Romans left the province
of Dacia in 271 AD, but Transylvania remained the crossroads of migrating
people for the next seven centuries. The Romanized Dacians did not leave
but hid in the woods and mountains, keeping the Romanian culture alive.
This theory of 2000 years of Dacian-Roman continuity justifies Romanian
possession of the territory of Transylvania and confirms their primacy as
the indigenous inhabitants (see e.g. KOVRIG 1986).
Ad 2: Treatment of the Romanians by Hungarians
in the Dual Monarchy
In the 15th century, Hungary was one of the great powers of Europe. In
1526, the Hungarians were defeated by the Turks at Mohacs and large parts
of Hungary fell under Turkish occupation. In 1690, Transylvania was conquered
by the Habsburg Emperor and it remained under Habsburg rule until 1867. In
this period, many Romanians came to Transylvania and soon outnumbered the
Szeklers. After the establishment of the Habsburg Dual Monarchy some liberal
principles were included in the Hungarian constitution. The Romanians in
Transylvania gained recognition as a ‘nation’, but gaining equal
rights and true representation in the Habsburg parliament was a more difficult
matter. In regard to culture and language, between 1867 and the First World
War a true ‘magyarization’ of the ethnic minorities in Transylvania
took place. The Hungarians believed that this transformation, although compulsory,
would be in the interest of the minorities (MIHOK 1990). Both the Hungarians
and the group of ethnic Germans in Transylvania claimed racial, social
and cultural superiority. This has contributed enormously to the continual
conflicts between these groups and the Romanian people. Many Romanians
felt like second-class citizens (DEÁK 1992).
Ad 3: Territorial changes during and after
the two World Wars
In 1878, the Kingdom of Romania was founded (not including Transylvania).
As an outcome of the First World War, Romania gained Transylvania, the
Banat, Crisana and Maramures. During the war, Romania joined the Allied
Forces. On that basis it could claim territorial extension during the peace
negotiations. Austria-Hungary had to be split up, and according to
the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination each ‘nation’
should have its own state. But the ethnic mosaic of Transylvania did
not allow simple application of such principles. There was no choice
but to relinquish rule by one or the other unitary state, and the victors
of the war favoured Romania. This Peace Settlement of Trianon (1920)
is still a trauma for the Hungarians. They felt that a great injustice
had been done.
Territorial interests and historical sentiments determined the positions
of both Hungary and Romania during the Second World War. Hungary sided
with the Germans, initially with success: by Italo-German arbitration (Treaty
of Vienna) Hungary reannexed the northern and southeastern part of Transylvania
in 1940. In these reannexed lands, the Romanian minority was often mistreated
by the Hungarian authorities. After the Germans were defeated in Romania
in August 1944, Romania abandoned the Axis powers and joined the Allies.
The Romanians then took revenge for the violations committed by the Hungarians
a few years earlier. Transylvania was put under Soviet military rule. After
the war, the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 reaffirmed the Trianon territorial
settlement (KOVRIG 1986, pp.475-77).
Ad 4: Discrimination of Hungarians during
the communist period
During the first years of communist rule, the Hungarians enjoyed extensive
political and cultural privileges. Under pressure from the Soviets, who
themselves used this concept often in their country, the Romanian government
established the ‘Autonomous Hungarian Province’ in 1952. It
was situated in the middle and east of Transylvania, comprising a large
majority of Szekler Hungarians (ROTH 1996, p.137). In practice, the region
had no real autonomous rights, but the Hungarians living there did have
slightly more freedom in using their language and expressing their culture.
During and after the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the Romanians constrained
the minority rights in the region, fearing that the Hungarians of Transylvania
would grab the chance to protest. In 1959, the Hungarian Bolyai University
in Cluj was merged with the Romanian Babes University, causing much alarm
under the Hungarians. In 1960, the character of the Autonomous Hungarian
Province was changed in two ways: symbolically, by a change of name to
‘Mures Autonomous Hungarian Region’, and ethnically by a change
of boundaries that reduced the percentage of Hungarians. In the new Mures
Autonomous Hungarian Region, Hungarians were reduced from 77.3 per cent to
62.2 per cent, while the Romanian proportion went up from 20.1 per cent to
35.1 per cent (MIHOK 1990, p.209, 215). Ceausescu came to power in 1965.
In the new constitution of that year the expression ‘national minority’
was replaced by ‘co-inhabiting nationalities’. Within three years
of the beginning of the Ceausescu era, the autonomous region was abolished.
By the mid-seventies a true ‘romanianization campaign’ started, and the development of the ‘national (= Romanian) way to socialism’ was announced. Ceausescu, the ‘Conducator’ (Leader) of the people, saw himself as the successor of former rulers of the Dacian Empire. Parallel to the glorification of the Romanian culture and history, cultural activities of other ethnic groups were gradually forbidden (MIHOK 1990). Hungarians were excluded from leading positions, and it was forbidden to speak the Hungarian language at work. Large industrial projects were set up in Transylvania, especially in the less densely populated ‘Szekler’ counties of Harghita and Covasna, and in German territories. Romanians from outside Transylvania were forced to settle in this Hungarian territory. At the same time Hungarian professionals and skilled workers were forced to accept employment in predominantly Romanian districts. In the development of the urban centres in the 1970s and 1980s, notably Cluj, Oradea and Brasov, Romanians were given some advantages as regards housing. As a result, the percentage of Hungarians in those towns decreased (KOVRIG 1986, p.481).
The gradual romanianization of education started with the obligation for Hungarian schools (or Hungarian sections of Romanian schools) to give part of their lessons in Romanian. History books were rewritten in order to correspond with the Romanian theory of Dacian-Roman continuity. Hungarian historical atlases were strictly forbidden. At the University of Cluj the Hungarian teaching staff was gradually diminished, and those who remained had to teach in Romanian-language departments (KOVRIG 1986, p.482).
There were some special radio and television broadcasts in the Hungarian and German language, but these were strictly rationed (two hours of TV a week) and controlled. Some books in Hungarian could be published. But like the broadcasts, they contained nothing of interest to the Hungarian community; they reflected official Romanian policy, translated in Hungarian. Hungarian historical monuments, buildings and graves were neglected or destroyed. All elements of bilingualism disappeared from daily life, even in the almost homogeneous Hungarian towns.
Ad 5: Continuation of discrimination after
1989
After the fall and execution of Ceausescu, and the violent revolution
in December 1989, major changes occurred in Romania, with great positive
impact on daily life. Freedom of the press, the right to assemble and to
form political parties and other societal interest groups, and the opportunity
to travel came into effect for the whole Romanian population, including
the minority groups. Gradually the general situation in Romania worsened,
and it became obvious that the former second echelon of the Communist Party
was now in charge.
In March 1990, a serious riot broke out in Tîrgu Mures because of
the decision to reopen Hungarian schools and to allow bilingual signs.
The strong Romanian opposition to these plans resulted in riots; officially
three people were killed and about 269 injured (BEYER 1991, p.484).
In June 1990, the ‘revolt of the miners’ took place in Bucharest, in which a student protest against the government was violently suppressed in a ‘spontaneous’ action by miners. The miners responded to an appeal by President Iliescu to ‘restore order’ in the Romanian capital. Five people were killed and 462 injured. There are strong indications that the Securitate took part in this operation as well. This event confirmed the suspicions of many who were now convinced that communism was still in power, although with a milder face (BEYER 1991).
Especially since the elections of 1992, the situation of the minorities has deteriorated in several respects. Many of the initial promises have not been fulfilled and many measures actually taken have been reversed. In February 1991 the access of minority groups to the television media was reduced.
The reopening of independent Hungarian schools in Transylvania proceeded very slowly and encountered many difficulties. But in spite of local opposition many special schools for Hungarians and Germans were set up, either separately or as part of other schools. In general the new education policy was a significant improvement compared to the restrictions on education in minority languages. At the beginning of the school year 1991-92, even the central government was trying to reverse the positive developments. The efforts of Hungarian and German schools to enlarge their influence on the curriculum had to be stopped.(GABANYI 1991, p.507).
An alarming phenomenon was the rise of right-extremist Romanian nationalism during the post-revolution years. One of the most fanatic movements was Vatra Româneasca (Romanian Hearth), which provoked a primitive hatred against all minorities, including Jews. The Romanian government did not vigorously condemn these Romanian nationalist organizations. Perhaps it did not want to. It may have been afraid to abandon this nationalism, which had been growing among the Romanians, because the popularity of the Iliescu’s party was decreasing.
After months of discussion, the Romanian parliament approved a new constitution in November 1991. But the representatives of the minority groups opposed this constitution, although it recognized the right of the minorities to ‘maintain, develop and express their identity.’ The minorities criticized the formulation that ‘Romania is a unitary state, with the Romanian language as the single official language.’
In 1995, the Hungarians protested against a new education law which, they said, discriminates against their language. The law made teaching of history, geography and civic courses in the Romanian language obligatory even in schools for the minorities. During several demonstrations they demanded equal rights, equal chances, and education in their mother tongue. The protesters also demanded the return of Church property seized by the communists in the late fourties. UDMR chairman Béla Márko said the Hungarian minority rejects the ‘forced assimilation’ stipulated by the new law (OMRI Daily Digest, several editions).
The Germans in South Tyrol
In 1920, after the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire, Italy was ceded
the area of South Tyrol (MARKUSSE 1991, pp.130-152). Italy claimed that
the new national border now following mountain ranges in the Alps would
be more logical and easier to defend. However, the new border did not follow
the ethnic borders, so that 235.000 Germans in the northern part of the
region fell under Italian rule (together with the small group of Ladins,
which will be left out of consideration). Immediately laws were made concerning
regional autonomy, but the fascist government, installed in 1922, declared
these to be void, and started a campaign against any form of autonomy.
A policy of ‘italianization’ was initiated in order to
assimilate the minority. Industrial investments were directed to the area,
attracting Italians migrants. In 1939, ‘the Option’ was implemented;
anyone who did not want to become an Italian had to leave. As a consequence
of this rule, 88 per cent of the Germans left, although some returned later.
Largely because of these measures 30 per cent of the population is nowadays
Italian, and the Germans have become a minority in cities where once they
were large majorities.
After World War II, guarantees were given to the Germans for a legislative
and executive autonomy so that bilingual schools, road signs, official
documents, etc. could be reinstated. Also local administrative jobs would
be divided between the two ethnic groups based on local proportions. The
situation was still unsatisfactory to the Germans, and after 1957 a radicalization
occurred in the form of separatist movements, demonstrations against building
projects meant for Italians and the bombing of Italian national symbols
and infrastructure. As a result of this a commission was formed that later
suggested a package-deal; autonomy was implemented between 1972 and 1991.
The province of Bolzen/Bolzano and a few bordering towns in Trentino were
given legislative and executive autonomy, meaning that the 280.000 ethnic
Germans (constituting 65 per cent of the inhabitants of Bolzen) are now
dominant in the influential provincial parliament. The province can decide
independently on issues concerning housing projects, planning, most economic
activities including tourism and agriculture within the bounds of the national
constitution and about public order, education, public services and social
security within normal national laws. A drastic measure is the so-called
ethnic proportion. The jobs in the (semi-)public sector are distributed
equally among the different ethnic groups, meaning that by the year 2000
some 63 per cent of these jobs will be reserved for ethnic Germans. Italians
are frustrated by the strict proportional division. The number of ethnic
Italians in the autonomous region has dropped slightly because of these
measures; some have moved south, others have registered as ethnic Germans,
in order to enjoy the privileges of the Germans. Because of the bad economic
situation in industry and the proportion-rules for administrative positions,
the number of jobs for Italians has decreased. As a result of this frustrating
situation, neo-fascism has flourished.
There are quite a few similarities between South Tyrol and Transylvania.
Both cases have two large groups with large cultural differences between
them, a strong political party supporting the minority’s interests,
a history of ‘nationalisation’ of the minority, the deliberate
changing of minority proportions using industrial allocation and also the
changing of administrative borders. Finally, in both areas there has been
a radicalisation of politics, with extremists on both sides attracting
much attention.
Even so, the differences between the regions are too big to use the South
Tyrolean model for Romania. First of all, in Italy regions have considerable
executive powers, while in Romania politics are still very centralised.
In Tyrol the Germans form a compact group along the Austrian border, while
the Hungarians in Romania are spread over a larger area, mostly in places
with a mixed population, with only one concentrated region. This region
is situated in the middle of the country, not along the Hungarian border.
Furthermore, contrary to South-Tyrol, in Romania there is an outspoken
fear for the separation of Transylvania, which leads to the rejection of
any form of autonomy.
If the model of autonomy were to be used for Romania, problems could be
expected to arise in defining the exact areas where autonomy should be
instated; how many Hungarians (percentage or absolute numbers?) must live
in a village or town to belong to such a region? Also the implementation
of proportion-measures for administrative jobs would become difficult because
of the inter-ethnic marriages; when is a person Hungarian and when Romanian?
Finally, the rights of non-Hungarians in these regions would have to be
guaranteed. Will they, just as the Italians in South Tyrol, have to face
a diminishing number of jobs and emigrate?
The Gagauz in the Republic of Moldova
In Moldova, north-east of Romania, the Gagauz minority has been given
an autonomous region with an elected legislature and executive authorities
with considerable powers (SOCOR 1994, pp.20-28). The Gagauz are a Christian
Turkic people who settled in southern Bessarabia as colonists of the Russian
Empire after 1812. Most of the 189.000 Gagauz (according to the USSR census
of 1989) live in the Moldovan and Ukrainian part of Bessarabia. Some 70
per cent (153.000) live in Moldova.
Until 1989, Gagauz culture and language were eroded by Soviet influences,
but as the end of the USSR became apparent, ethnic revival was stimulated
-strangely enough- by Moscow. They were told that a non-Soviet Moldova
would worsen their situation and that they would lose land, be ‘romanianized’
and be drawn into a Greater Romania. Therefore the Gagauz decided to back
the USSR and form the ‘Gagauz SSR’ when Moldova became independent
in 1990. In 1992 and 1993, Gagauz paramilitary groups terrorized Moldovan
institutions and killed dozens of people. The tide turned when the dissolution
of the USSR became apparent, the independence of Ukraine and Moldova materialized
and when Moldova decided against unification with Romania. Radicals were
removed from influential positions and talks with the government in Chisinau
about the status of the Gagauz were started. At first, the Gagauz insisted
Moldova should be a confederation of the Gagauz, Dniester and Moldova ‘states’.
In 1994, however, a compromise was reached.
After some difficulties the pragmatic Moldovan politicians of the Agrarian
Party, a parliamentary majority after February 1994, submitted the ‘Special
legal status of Gagauzia’ draft law, creating a bilateral deal with
the Gagauz. It is interesting to note that this law only could pass through
parliament after the small but noisy group of pro-Romanian politicians
had been marginalised after the 1994 elections. The draft law recognized
the Gagauz as a ‘people’, and Gaugazia as an autonomous national-territorial
unit, with a right to self-determination. This means that secession could
be an option for Gagauzia, but only when Moldova changes its status as
an independent state, meaning uniting with Romania. The Gagauz also have
the right to a certain level of independence for their internal, educational
and military affairs.
The autonomous territory comprises thirty settlements where the Gagauz
are a majority; referenda determine whether other settlements with a high
proportion of Gagauz join the region. ‘Landlocked’ non-Gagauz
villages have the right to stay loyal to Chisinau, whereas Gagauz villages
without a common border with the main concentration can still join. Gagauz,
Moldovan and Russian are the three official languages. At the moment Russian
is the only language known to most people, and therefore the lingua franca.
Gagauz is becoming more and more popular and Moldovan is the language used
for communication with national institutions.
As for thecomparisonof the Gagauz situation with Transylvania, the progressive way in which the draft law was prepared for ratification indicates a few differences that can be found between the Moldovan and the Romanian situation. Firstly, most Moldovans accept the idea of ethnological diversity. Most Romanians would instantly reject the idea. Secondly, the Gagauz minority lives in compact areas, which facilitates the introduction of territorial autonomy. The Hungarians of Romania are a majority in only a few regions. Territorial autonomy would always involve including other ethnic groups in Hungarian areas.
The problem with the implementation of both models is that individual rights could suffer under the emphasis on ethnic groups and their group rights, because there will always be a significant number of non-Hungarians within the autonomous area. The difference in size of the minorities is another important point. The Germans in South Tyrol number 280.000, the Gagauz of Moldova only 153.000. The Hungarians of Romania form a much larger proportion of the total population of 22.8 million; 7 per cent (1.6 million) according to the national census of 1992. As these numbers are considerably bigger than in the cases mentioned above, Romanians conceive the possible autonomy as a large and direct threat to the existence of their language, values and culture in Transylvania, the heart of Romania.
Territorial autonomy can be a solution to ethnic problems, but only on
two conditions: 1) the ethnic minority group must live compactly together,
and 2) all parties involved must have agreed to the idea of autonomy. In
Transylvania these two conditions are not fulfilled. Many Hungarians live
outside the compact Szekler area and would not profit from special rights
in the Hungarian Autonomous Region. Another problem would be the rights
of the Romanians living in that area: their claim to use the Romanian language
would be justifiable.
At this moment most Romanians oppose the idea of an Hungarian Autonomous
Region. Some of their arguments might be doubtful, but this is of marginal
importance. As long as large groups of Romanians oppose the idea, no matter
their argument, it is in no-ones interest to force the matter, since it
would undermine the whole idea of autonomous regions. It would lead to
a further radicalization of opinions, in a situation where a better mutual
understanding is needed.
Until the end of 1996, the so-called minority problem of Hungarians in
Romania was more or less created by politicians and radical ethnic leaders.
Both groups could refer to all kinds of injustice and discrimination in
the past, committed by all groups in several decades, leading to feelings
of superiority, revenge and so on. Instead of focussing on the past it
would be better to face the future. Both parties will have to become more
realistic and open-minded to find a solution to the dispute. Romanians must
accept that they are living in a multi-ethnic state, like Hungarians have
to learn to live with the Romanian majority.
In every ethnically mixed area the rights of minorities must be protected
(thus including the rights of Romanians living in dominantly Hungarian
areas). The right to use ones own language in schools and public life is
one of the most important rights. The concept of local self government,
as practised in several Central and Eastern European countries like Hungary,
has proved to be a useful concept.
The change in government in November 1996 has resulted in better relations between Hungary and Romania, with positive effects on the relations between Romanians and Hungarians living in Romania. This might reduce tensions, most of all because ‘top down’ incitement will probably be less. This might create a better context for the peaceful living together of the several ethnic groups of Romania, which will reduce the claim for territorial autonomy on a regional scale. But some sort of decentralization of decision-making would be good for Romania, which could run parallel to some kind of self-government on a local scale. Such a model could be of great importance in regions or communities with a large percentage of a minority group.
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